Proof Before Purchase: The HFS Gate That Ends Slideware (A DPW Strategy)

Over the past several weeks, more CPOs have been reaching out asking about the Hansen Fit Score (HFS). Since some of the core questions are the same or similar, I thought it would be a good idea to share one recent conversation I had regarding the TealBook scoring. If you haven’t had the opportunity to read the corresponding post, you can access it through the following link: TealBook Hansen Fit Score Assessment (DPW) Important Clarification.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TABLE

For those seeking the core differences between traditional procurement technology evaluations and the Hansen Fit Score (HFS) approach, the following table provides an at-a-glance comparison. This executive summary distills the primary benefits and impacts of adopting an HFS, “proof-before-purchase” procurement model—enabling time-constrained leaders to quickly assess the strategic implications before diving into the detailed analysis.

ANALYSIS – CPO QUESTIONS & ANSWERS TRANSCRIPT

Q1 – What does the following term mean? Prove TealBook can operate on our canonical rails without creating a silo. This is a 30-minute live demo with artifact handoff. No slideware.

ANSWER: This is a readiness-first deployment challenge written in procurement/technology integration language. Let me break down each component:

The Core Demand

“Prove TealBook can operate on our canonical rails without creating a silo.”

Canonical rails = The organization’s standardized data model, governance framework, and integration architecture (their “system of record” backbone)

Without creating a silo = the solution must integrate into existing systems, not become another disconnected point solution requiring separate data management.

Translation: “Show us TealBook works within our existing infrastructure and data standards, not as a standalone system requiring duplicate supplier records, separate workflows, or manual data synchronization.”

The Test Format

“30-minute live demo with artifact handoff”

• Live demo = Real system, real data, real-time execution (not pre-recorded)
• Artifact handoff = Produces actual output files/records that can be validated (transaction logs, data exports, integration proof)
• 30 minutes = Tight timeframe proves the vendor knows their system and can execute efficiently

Translation: “Perform the integration in our environment, with our data, and give us the actual outputs to verify it worked.”

The Anti-Theater Clause

“No slideware”

• Slideware = PowerPoint presentations, capability decks, roadmap promises
• This explicitly bans talking about what the system could do

Translation: “Don’t tell us how it works. Show us it’s working. Now.”

What This Demand Reveals

This is someone (likely influenced by the Hansen Model thinking) who:

1. Understands the 70-80% failure pattern – Point solutions that don’t integrate become expensive shelf-ware
2. Knows vendors oversell – “Slideware” suggests past experience with promises that didn’t materialize
3. Values evidence over claims – “Artifact handoff” means provable results, not demos
4. Has canonical architecture – They’ve built data standards and want solutions that respect them
5. Won’t waste time – 30 minutes forces efficiency and proves operational readiness

How This Relates to Your Framework

This requirement operationalizes what I’ve been advocating:

NO – Equation-based vendor approach:

• An hour-long PowerPoint about capabilities
• Canned demo with fake data
• “We can integrate with anything.”
• Sign the contract, then discover integration problems

YES – Agent-based (this requirement):

• Prove integration with the actual architecture
• Use real organizational data
• Produce verifiable artifacts
• No sale until operational proof is delivered

Why TealBook Specifically

I’ve written about TealBook in the Procurement Insights archives. This requirement is asking them to prove they’re not just another vendor optimization tool that becomes a silo—they need to demonstrate they can operate within the organization’s existing governance/data framework.

The challenge tests:

• Can TealBook supplier data sync with the canonical supplier master?
• Do TealBook workflows integrate with existing procurement processes?
• Does TealBook create duplicate records or respect existing IDs?
• Can outputs be traced through the entire procurement system?

Bottom Line

This is a Hansen Fit Score gate expressed as a vendor requirement: prove you can integrate with a practitioner’s organizational capability before they consider purchasing. It’s the opposite of “buy technology, hope it integrates” — it’s “prove integration, then we’ll discuss purchase.”

It’s what I’ve been advocating vendors should do (but rarely do): demonstrate operational fit within the client’s existing architecture before deployment, not after the contract is signed.

Q2 – Is this what makes the Hansen Fit Score unique: proof with real data in real time, provided before signing the contract? In short, we are not buying a concept; we are purchasing a proven solution. If you can’t get past this gate, there is no point in continuing.

ANSWER: Exactly. This is the fundamental shift from equation-based to agent-based procurement.

What Makes HFS Unique

Traditional vendor evaluation:

• Review capabilities deck
• Watch the canned demo
• Check references
• Sign contract
• Then discover integration problems

Hansen Fit Score approach:

• Prove integration with practitioner architecture
• Use the practitioner’s actual data
• Produce verifiable artifacts
• Pass operational gates
• Then, discuss the contract

The gate is absolute: No proof = No sale. Period.

Why This Terrifies Vendors

Most vendors cannot pass this test because:

1. Their solution requires organizational changes (you bend to fit their system)
2. Integration is custom work (not available in 30-minute demo)
3. They’ve never operated on canonical rails (they are the silo)
4. Their demos use fake data (real data exposes limitations)
5. They sell capability, not operational fit

This is why the industry defaults to slideware—most solutions can’t prove operational fit before purchase. In short, they are selling concepts versus solutions.

The Market Implication

If HFS becomes the standard procurement gate, it eliminates 70-80% of vendor pitches immediately because they cannot demonstrate real-time integration with the client’s architecture.

Vendors that survive:

• Already built for canonical integration
• Can demo with client data on demand
• Produce artifacts that prove workflow integration
• Have operational proof packs ready

Vendors that fail:

• Require months of “implementation services”
• Need the client to change processes to fit their system
• Create duplicate data structures
• Can’t demonstrate integration without consulting engagement

What This Means for DPW 2025

The Procurement Insights vendor tracker asks practitioners to observe whether vendors assess readiness before pitching. HFS adds the next level: Even if they assess readiness, can they prove operational fit before contract signing?

The question for every DPW vendor: “Can you do a 30-minute live demo with our data, on our canonical rails, producing artifacts we can verify—right now, before we sign anything?”

Most will say: “After implementation…” or “During the pilot…” or “We’d need to scope that…”

Translation: They can’t pass the HFS gate.

The Paradigm Shift

I am not just advocating for readiness assessment (which can be conducted in the theater). I am demanding operational proof as a purchasing gate.

This transforms procurement from:

• “Which vendor has the best features?”
• To: “Which vendor can prove they work within our existing capability?”

That’s the difference between buying a concept (vendor promises) and purchasing a proven solution (demonstrated operational fit).

Bottom line: HFS makes vendor promises falsifiable. Either they can prove it works in your environment, or they can’t. No amount of slideware changes that binary outcome.

Q3 – Why don’t all vendors do this?

Because the current market structure rewards not doing it.

Economic Reality

Vendor that requires proof before sale:

• Shows integration capability upfront
• Client sees limitations immediately
• Deal cycles extend (more evaluation time)
• Close rate drops (some clients walk away)
• Revenue is delayed until proof is delivered

Vendor that sells concept first:

• Impressive capability deck
• Aspirational roadmap
• Quick contract signature
• Revenue immediate
• Problems discovered during implementation (after money received)

Market selects for the second approach because it’s more profitable.

The Implementation Revenue Model

Most vendors make MORE money when integration is difficult:

Proof-before-sale vendor:

• Sells working solution: $500K
• Minimal services needed: $50K
• Total: $550K

Concept-first vendor:

• Sells platform: $500K
• “Integration services”: $800K
• “Change management”: $400K
• “Optimization consulting”: $600K
• Total: $2.3M

Failed integration is more profitable than working integration.

The Consultant Complicity

Big consultancies don’t demand HFS-style proof because they profit from integration complexity:

• Simple integration = small services engagement
• Complex integration = large services engagement
• Failed integration = remediation services engagement

Requiring proof before purchase eliminates the revenue stream from the services.

The Buyer’s Dilemma

Procurement professionals who demand proof-before-sale face career risk:

Scenario 1: Require proof, vendor fails

• No purchase made
• Boss asks: “Why didn’t we buy anything?”
• Practitioner looks like obstruction

Scenario 2: Buy without proof, implementation fails

• Blame “change management” or “organizational resistance”
• Vendor and consultant agree
• Practitioner keeps job (everyone failed together)

The system punishes buyers who demand proof.

The Executive Problem

CFOs/CIOs want to show progress quarterly:

HFS approach:

• Q1: Assess readiness
• Q2: Build capability
• Q3: Vendor proof demonstrations
• Q4: Maybe purchase if proof passes

Can’t report “AI transformation” for a year.

Traditional approach:

• Q1: Sign AI contract
• Announce “AI transformation underway”
• Get promoted before implementation fails

The system rewards announcing initiatives, not delivering outcomes.

Why RAM Worked (And Why It’s Rare)

RAM could offer 30-minute proof because:

1. I built it agent-based (designed for integration)
2. I had actual working code (not vaporware)
3. I wasn’t maximizing services revenue
4. I measured success by outcomes (97.3% accuracy), not deals closed

NOTE: Virginia’s eVA model was outcome-based procurement before the term existed—and it validates the HFS approach perfectly.

The eVA Revolutionary Concept

• Traditional model: Pay for software license + implementation services (regardless of whether it works)

• eVA model: Pay based on transaction throughput (only pay for what successfully processed)

• Translation: Vendor only gets paid if the system actually works in the client’s environment.

• Most vendors optimize for sales volume rather than implementation success.

The Market Failure

Current procurement evaluates vendors on:

• Feature lists (slideware)
• Analyst rankings (based on revenue/customer count)
• Reference calls (pre-screened success stories)
• Demos (canned, fake data)

None of these predicts operational fit.

HFS evaluates on:

• Operational proof with real data
• Integration with canonical architecture
• Artifact production and verification
• Pass/fail gate before purchase

This predicts operational fit but requires vendor capability that most don’t have.

Why It Won’t Change Easily

For HFS to become standard, you need:

1. Vendors to build integration-ready solutions (higher development cost)
2. Buyers to demand proof before purchase (career risk)
3. Consultants to support proof-first (lower services revenue)
4. Executives to wait for proof (quarterly pressure)
5. Analysts to rank based on proof capability (current rankings become obsolete)

Every incentive in the system opposes this change.

The Inflection Point

HFS adoption accelerates when:

1. Failure costs exceed evaluation costs (Accenture 11K layoffs = signal)
2. Board liability emerges (directors sued for approving unproven tech)
3. Insurance requires proof (cyber insurance model: prove security before coverage)
4. Regulations mandate gates (healthcare/finance precedent)

We’re approaching that point. The $30-40 billion GenAI spend, with 5% returns (as per the Cognizant article), is creating pressure.

Bottom Line

Vendors don’t do HFS-style proof because the market doesn’t require it, and requiring it reduces revenue.

The current system is:

• Profitable for vendors (sell concept + services)
• Safe for buyers (fail collectively, no individual blame)
• Lucrative for consultants (complex integrations = big engagements)
• Fast for executives (announce initiatives quickly)

HFS threatens all of these dynamics.

The challenge isn’t convincing vendors that HFS is right—it’s changing market incentives so that proof-before-sale becomes a competitive advantage rather than a revenue disadvantage.

That only happens when the costs of failure (layoffs, lawsuits, reputation damage) exceed the costs of demanding proof upfront.

Accenture’s 11,000 layoffs suggest we’re getting close.

Q4 – Why don’t all practitioners insist on this crucial gate?

Practitioners face a brutal combination of a lack of strategic insights, fear, and structural constraints that make demanding HFS-level proof professionally dangerous.

The Knowledge Gap

Most practitioners don’t know this gate exists or why it matters:

• CPM/CPSM curricula don’t teach organizational readiness assessment
• Industry conferences showcase vendor capabilities, not integration methodology
• Analyst reports rank features, not operational fit
• Their mentors/predecessors didn’t use this gate either

They’re replicating evaluation approaches they learned, which were designed by vendors.

The Confidence Problem

Even practitioners who suspect proof-before-sale matters often lack the confidence to demand it:

• “Maybe I’m being too difficult.”
• “Other organizations don’t require this.”
• “The consultant says it’s standard to prove during implementation.”
• “Am I the only one who thinks this matters?”

Without external validation (Hansen Model, Krishna’s positioning), they doubt their own judgment.

Career Risk Asymmetry

Demanding proof creates personal career risk with no personal upside:

If they demand proof and the vendor fails:

• Project stalls (looks like an obstruction)
• Executive frustration (“Why can’t we move forward?”)
• Vendor complains to stakeholders
• Consultant undermines practitioner credibility
• Career damage

If they skip proof and implementation fails:

• Blame is distributed (vendor, consultant, “change management”)
• The practitioner keeps their job (everyone failed together)
• Can claim “industry best practices were followed”
• No individual accountability

Rational self-interest = don’t demand proof.

Political Complexity

Demanding HFS-level proof challenges influential stakeholders:

• The vendor spent months building relationships with executives, promising transformation

• The consultant has a services contract contingent on the technology purchase

• The executive sponsor already announced the initiative publicly

• The procurement team doesn’t have the authority to block initiatives that executives have endorsed

Organizational Dysfunction

Most organizations can’t pass HFS requirements themselves:

Practitioner demands: “Prove it works on our canonical rails.”

Honest answer: “We don’t have canonical rails. Our supplier data is fragmented across 17 systems with no master data management.”

The proof requirement exposes organizational inadequacy that no one wants to acknowledge.

The Complexity Barrier

Implementing HFS-style evaluation requires capabilities most teams lack:

• Understanding what “canonical rails” means
• Defining proof requirements
• Architecting integration tests
• Interpreting artifact outputs
• Evaluating pass/fail objectively

It’s easier to evaluate slideware than to ask for operational proof.

Time Pressure

Executives demand fast decisions:

HFS approach:

• 2 weeks: Define proof requirements
• 4 weeks: Vendor prepares demonstrations
• 2 weeks: Evaluate artifacts
• 2 weeks: Final decision
• Total: 10 weeks

Traditional (Executive) approach assumption:

• Week 1: Vendor presentations
• Week 2: Reference calls
• Week 3: Contract negotiation
• Week 4: Signature
• Total: 4 weeks

Faster = better for quarterly reporting.

The Consultant Narrative

Consultants actively discourage proof-before-sale:

“That’s not how enterprise software works.” “Proof comes during the pilot phase.” “You’ll slow down your transformation.” “We’ve implemented this at 50 companies—trust the process”

Practitioners who resist this narrative get labeled as “blockers” or “not strategic thinkers.”

The Missing Framework

Until the Hansen Model formalization, there was no structured methodology for proof-before-sale:

• No scoring system
• No gate definitions
• No proof requirements
• No evaluation criteria
• No pass/fail thresholds

You can’t demand what you can’t define.

The Accenture Effect

Here’s why practitioners don’t demand proof even when they suspect they should:

Scenario: Practitioner sees Accenture laying off 11K people “due to AI”

Logical response: “Maybe we should demand proof before deploying AI.“

Actual response: “Accenture has 750,000 employees and works with the world’s largest companies. If they’re struggling with AI, what chance do we have? Better just hire them to help us.”

Fear drives them toward the failing vendors, not away from them.

Why Experienced CPOs Are Different

They insist on proof because they:

1. Have battle scars – Saw failures firsthand
2. Are independent – No corporate political constraints
3. Have frameworks – Know how to structure proof requirements
4. Have authority – Clients hire them specifically for uncompromising evaluations
5. Have nothing to lose – Walking away from bad vendors is their value proposition

Corporate practitioners usually lack all five of these protections.

The Systemic Trap

The system perpetuates itself:

1. Practitioners don’t demand proof
2. Vendors don’t build proof capability
3. Consultants don’t support proof-first evaluation
4. Implementations fail at 70-80%
5. Industry accepts this as “normal”
6. The next generation of practitioners learns this is “how it works”

Breaking this cycle requires external pressure (regulations, liability, board mandates) that doesn’t exist yet.

Bottom Line

In the past, practitioners didn’t insist on HFS gates because:

• They don’t know it’s possible
• They lack the information and, therefore, confidence to demand it
• They face career risk for being “difficult”
• They lack the authority to override executive/consultant consensus
• They lack a methodology to structure proof requirements
• They face time pressure to decide quickly
• They’re actively discouraged by consultants and vendors
• The system punishes those who demand proof and rewards those who don’t

The tragedy is that practitioners who demand proof (a growing number of CPOs in 2025) achieve significantly higher success rates 80%, while those who don’t achieve success rates of 20-30%.

However, the market punishes the first group and rewards the second—until the failures become so catastrophic (Accenture layoffs, $30-40 billion wasted) that the system is forced to change.

Q5 – What is the average time it takes for a ProcureTech vendor to close a new client deal, the sales cycle under the current system?

The average ProcureTech sales cycle is 6-18 months** for enterprise deals, broken down roughly as:

Initial contact to qualified opportunity: 1-3 months Demo/evaluation phase: 2-4 months Proposal/negotiation: 2-6 months Procurement/legal review: 1-3 months Contract signature: Final 2-4 weeks

** Question 4 Answer (4 weeks) described an executive’s wishful timeline—what they want the process to take, not what actually happens. Question 5 answer (6-18 months) described the actual enterprise sales cycle—what really occurs in practice.

Factors that extend cycles:

• Enterprise size (Fortune 500 = longer)
• Number of stakeholders (CPO, CIO, CFO alignment)
• Security/compliance reviews
• Budget approval processes
• Competitive evaluations (RFPs add 3-6 months)

Why this matters for HFS:

The 30-minute proof requirement would collapse this to 4-8 weeks:

• Week 1: Define proof requirements
• Week 2: Vendor demonstrates on canonical rails
• Week 3: Evaluate artifacts, pass/fail decision
• Week 4-8: Contract negotiation (only if proof passed)

Vendors resist HFS because:

Current system: 12-month average × $500K deal = $6M annual quota requires 12 active opportunities

HFS system: 6-week cycle × fail rate rises from 30% to 70% (most can’t prove integration) = Need 40+ opportunities to hit the same quota

The brutal math:

• Vendor loses 6-10 months of “working the deal”
• Close rate drops from 70% to 30% (proof requirement eliminates unfit vendors)
• Sales team productivity plummets
• Revenue falls

This is why vendors claim:

• “Proof comes during implementation” = Protects the 12-month sales cycle

• “We need to scope your requirements first” = Delays the proof moment

• “Let’s start with a pilot” = Gets contract signed before proof is required

The HFS approach: Proof first = 6-week evaluation, vendor fails immediately if they can’t demonstrate fit

Impact: Vendors who can’t pass HFS lose the deal in week 2 instead of month 12. That’s 10 months of sales effort eliminated, making HFS adoption an existential threat to vendors built on slideware.

The sales cycle length is a feature, not a bug—it gives vendors time to build relationships, overcome objections, and close deals even when operational fit is questionable. HFS eliminates that runway.

SUMMATION

Instead of becoming a ProcureTech lab rat, HFS benefits practitioners because they have limited resources to invest in a 10- to 12-month sales cycle. In short, during that time, they can assess more provider solutions to find the right fit.

HFS inverts the time/resource equation in favor of practitioners.

Current System: Vendor-Optimized

Practitioner resource allocation:

• 12 months tied up evaluating Vendor A
• 200+ hours: meetings, demos, reference calls, RFP responses
• 50+ stakeholder hours coordinated
• Legal/procurement/IT resources committed
• Result: Discover integration problems 18 months post-signature

Vendor gets: 12 months to build relationships, overcome objections, and secure executive sponsorship before operational questions surface

HFS System: Practitioner-Optimized

Practitioner resource allocation per vendor:

• Week 1: Define proof requirements (one-time work, reusable)
• Week 2: 30-minute vendor proof demonstration
• Week 3: Artifact evaluation (2-4 hours)
• Result: Pass/fail decision in 3 weeks

Math:

• Old system: 12 months = evaluate 1 vendor thoroughly
• HFS system: 12 months = evaluate 16 vendors (3 weeks each)

Or more realistically:

• 3 months = evaluate 4 vendors with HFS gates
• Find operational fit faster
• Deploy sooner
• Avoid 9 months of vendor courtship

The “Lab Rat” Problem

The current system forces practitioners to be unpaid QA testers:

1. Sign the contract based on slideware
2. Discover during implementation that the vendor can’t integrate
3. Spend 12-18 months troubleshooting
4. Vendor charges for “customization services”
5. The practitioner organization is the test environment

You’re debugging the vendor’s integration capability after paying them.

HFS flips this:

1. Vendor proves integration capability before contract
2. The vendor’s demo environment is the test
3. Pass = purchase; Fail = next vendor
4. A practitioner never becomes a lab rat

Resource Efficiency Example

Scenario: Evaluate 4 procurement platforms

Traditional approach:

• Vendor A: 12 months, fails during implementation, $2M wasted
• Start over with Vendor B: another 12 months
• Total: 24 months, $2M sunk cost, still no working solution

HFS approach:

• Vendor A: Week 1-3, fails proof demonstration, $0 spent
• Vendor B: Week 4-6, fails proof demonstration, $0 spent
• Vendor C: Week 7-9, passes proof, proceed to contract
• Deployed: Month 4
• Total: 4 months, $0 sunk cost, working solution deployed

The Strategic Advantage

With HFS, practitioners can:

1. Evaluate more vendors (16x capacity increase)
2. Find a better fit (test operational compatibility, not just features)
3. Deploy faster (weeks to decision vs. months)
4. Eliminate sunk costs (fail fast before contracts)
5. Reduce political risk (objective pass/fail vs. subjective “cultural fit”)

Why Vendors Fear This

If practitioners can evaluate 16 vendors in the time it currently takes to evaluate 1:

• Competition intensifies (more vendors get considered)
• Differentiation shifts (from relationships to operational proof)
• Sales leverage disappears (can’t “work the deal” for months)
• Slideware becomes worthless (proof trumps promises)

Vendors optimized for long sales cycles can’t compete in an HFS environment.

The Practitioner Empowerment

HFS gives practitioners what they currently lack: time sovereignty.

Current system:

• Vendor controls the timeline (drip-feed information, schedule demos, “need more discovery”)
• The practitioner is reduced to a reactive stakeholder
• 12 months hostage to the vendor’s process

HFS system:

• Practitioner controls the timeline (here are proof requirements; you have 2 weeks)
• Vendor is reactive
• Move to the next vendor immediately if proof fails

Bottom Line

HFS isn’t just about preventing failures—it’s about resource multiplication.

Instead of spending a year discovering one vendor can’t deliver, practitioners spend 3 weeks proving it, then move to the next candidate with 49 weeks remaining.

The “10-12 month sales cycle” isn’t serving practitioners—it’s protecting vendors who can’t prove operational fit. HFS collapses that timeline, eliminates the lab rat problem, and returns time sovereignty to buyers.

That’s why many vendors resist it: HFS makes buying efficient, which makes selling difficult for vendors built on slide decks and relationship cultivation instead of operational proof.

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BONUS COVERAGE – WHAT’S IN IT FOR THE VENDOR?

The NEW Win-Win Model

Practitioner wins:

• Zero sunk cost on failed evaluations
• Fast evaluation cycle (weeks, not months)
• Only pays for solutions that demonstrably work
• Reduced implementation risk

Vendor wins:

• Differentiation from slideware competitors
• Higher close rates with qualified prospects
• Premium pricing for proven integration
• Reduced sales cycle friction
• Recurring revenue from actual adoption

The Market Segmentation

HFS creates two vendor categories:

Category A: Integration-First Vendors

• Built for canonical rails from day one
• Pass HFS gates consistently
• Premium pricing, faster sales cycles
• High close rates with qualified prospects

Category B: Capability-First Vendors

• Built for feature demos
• Cannot pass HFS gates
• Forced to target immature organizations (no canonical architecture to test against)
• Longer sales cycles

This is healthy market segmentation. Category A serves mature organizations. Category B serves organizations that are not yet ready for proven solutions (though they should be building readiness rather than buying technology).

Why Vendors Should Embrace This

Smart vendors recognize:

1. The current model is unsustainable – 70-80% failure rates damage the entire industry’s reputation
2. Accenture layoffs are a warning – Failed implementations hurt everyone
3. Differentiation opportunity – “We pass HFS gates” becomes a competitive advantage
4. Premium pricing justification – Proven integration commands higher prices
5. Reduced sales costs – 6-week evaluation vs 18-month courtship