What If? Revisiting The Famous Nokia and Ericsson Case Study

Posted on June 1, 2025

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Since May 2007, when the Procurement Insights blog published its first post, one post has consistently garnered attention. In fact, year after year, this one post continues to rank #1 among all posts in terms of reads: Managing Supply Chain Risk: The Nokia and Ericsson Case Study

Case Study Recap

Nearly a decade ago, lighting struck a Philips microchip plant in New Mexico, causing a fire that contaminated millions of mobile phone chips.  Among Philips’ biggest customers were Nokia and Ericsson, the mobile phone manufacturers, but each reacted differently to the disaster.  Nokia’s supply-chain management strategy allowed it to switch suppliers quickly; it even re-engineered some of its phones to accept both American and Japanese chips, which meant its production line was relatively unaffected.  Ericsson, however, accepted Philips’ word that production at the plant would be back on track in a week and it took no action.  That decision cost Ericsson more than US $400 m in annual earnings and, perhaps more significantly, the company lost market share.  By contrast, Nokia’s profits rose by 42% that year.

What If Scenario

How would “strand commonality” have impacted or changed the outcome of the famous Nokia and Ericsson supplier risk case study?

Strand Commonality doesn’t predict disasters—it reveals patterns that make responses smarter, faster, and more strategic.

MODEL 2 ASSESSMENT

Using Hansen’s theory, Ericsson could have identified and acted on critical strands from historical supply chain disruptions, potentially mirroring Nokia’s success. Below, I outline the strands, actions enabled, changed outcomes, and impact on competitive advantage, with lead times of 3, 6, and 9 months (aligned with the prior response on competitive advantages).

1. Identified Strands from Historical Disruptions

Hansen’s theory would analyze events like:

  • 1995 Kobe Earthquake: Disrupted semiconductor supplies, highlighting single-supplier risks.
  • 1997 Toyota Fire: A supplier fire halted production, underscoring the need for multi-sourcing and rapid response.
  • 1999 Taiwan Earthquake: Affected chip production, emphasizing geographic risk concentration.
  • Common Strands:
    • Single-Supplier Dependence: Over-reliance on one supplier (e.g., Philips) increases vulnerability.
    • Natural Disaster Risks: Lightning, earthquakes, or fires can disrupt critical components.
    • Communication Gaps: Slow escalation (e.g., Ericsson’s technician delay) exacerbates impact.
    • Supply Chain Fragility: Globalized, just-in-time (JIT) systems lack buffers.
    • Recovery Misestimation: Suppliers may underestimate downtime (Philips’ one-week claim).

MODEL 1 RESPONSE & RESULTS

If Hansen’s Strand Commonality Theory had been applied during the famous Nokia–Ericsson supplier risk case (2000)—where a fire at a Philips chip factory caused vastly different outcomes for both companies—it could have completely altered Ericsson’s trajectory and further fortified Nokia’s lead at the time.


Quick Recap of the Case

  • March 2000: A lightning strike caused a fire at a Philips semiconductor plant in New Mexico.
  • Philips notified both Nokia and Ericsson.
  • Nokia:
    • Activated alternative suppliers within days.
    • Re-engineered components to bypass delays.
    • Took proactive inventory and redesign measures.
  • Ericsson:
    • Delayed response, assuming resolution within a few weeks.
    • Lacked agility and visibility in supply chain.
    • Lost over $400 million, eventually exiting the mobile phone market.

How Strand Commonality Would Have Changed the Outcome

1. Strand Intersections Nokia Acted On

Even though Nokia had no formal strand commonality framework, its actions aligned with it:

Strand TypeRecognized by Nokia?Example
Supplier Concentration Risk✅ YesKnew Philips was a single-source for key radio frequency chips
Geographic Disruption Pattern✅ YesAssumed weather/fire events could affect supply
Design Flexibility Readiness✅ YesModular architecture allowed redesign in days
Cross-tier Visibility✅ YesCommunicated directly with sub-tier suppliers

Outcome: Nokia saw the strands, acted immediately, and preserved market share.


2. Strand Commonality That Ericsson Missed

Had Hansen’s theory been applied, Ericsson might have noticed the convergence of risk strands earlier:

Missed StrandDescription
Overreliance on PhilipsNo mapped contingency for a strategic chip component
Fire + cleanroom correlationNo awareness of how minor fires in cleanrooms often trigger major delays
Slow response historical trendOrganizational culture underestimated risk escalation timelines
Philips yield disruption patternEarlier instances of Philips supply interruptions were ignored

With strand commonality, Ericsson would have triangulated these patterns and:

  • Activated contingency sourcing.
  • Accelerated component redesign.
  • Pressured Philips for prioritized allocation or alternate fab usage.
  • Potentially retained market presence in mobile communications.

How Hansen’s Theory Would Have Worked Practically

Strand Commonality FunctionEricsson’s MissWith Theory
Strand 1: Geography + Supplier Criticality✅ MissedWould have flagged fire risk + high dependency
Strand 2: Tier-2/3 Supplier Risk Mapping✅ MissedCould’ve modeled cascading delays across SKUs
Strand 3: Cross-industry disruption patterns✅ MissedCleanroom fires in pharma, electronics share same fragility
Strand 4: Supplier Communication Lag✅ MissedNokia escalated; Ericsson did not

Probable Alternate Scenario Using Strand Commonality

PhaseEricsson Action (w/ Strand Commonality)Result
DetectionUses pattern library to flag cleanroom fire risk + past yield lagsRisk dashboard alert triggers sourcing review
AnalysisIntersects supplier location, product dependency, event severityEscalation initiated within 48 hours
ResponseEngages alt fab in Asia, accelerates chip redesign with PhilipsAvoids 6-month delay, mitigates revenue loss
OutcomeRetains share in 3G phone marketContinues as Nokia’s global competitor

Long-Term Strategic Implication

Ericsson’s failure wasn’t technological—it was analytical.
With Hansen’s theory, they could’ve seen:

  • The same strands that Nokia saw—but acted on too late.
  • The early signs of a single-sourced vulnerability and the ripple effects across design, logistics, and time-to-market.

Conclusion

Had Ericsson used Strand Commonality Theory, it would have:

  • Turned a “black swan” into a gray swan event.
  • Matched or exceeded Nokia’s agility.
  • Possibly remained a dominant player in mobile phones.

In short, Strand Commonality doesn’t predict disasters—it reveals patterns that make responses smarter, faster, and more strategic.

MODEL 3 – RESPONSE & OUTCOME

Conclusion:

Hansen’s strand commonality would have transformed the Philips fire from a catastrophic “black swan” into a manageable disruption. By linking hidden data strands (weather, supplier health, logistics), both companies would have built resilient, agile supply chains—turning risk into strategic advantage.

MODEL 4 –

Illustrative Example: Early Detection Through Strand Commonality

To illustrate how strand commonality would work in practice, consider this specific example from the Nokia/Ericsson case:

Without strand commonality analytics, both companies tracked standard metrics like on-time delivery and quality from their direct suppliers. However, neither had visibility into the shared dependency on Philips’ New Mexico plant for radio frequency chips.

With strand commonality analytics:

1. The system would aggregate data from seemingly unrelated sources: component serial numbers, manufacturing plant codes, shipping manifests, and supplier financial reports.

2. Pattern recognition algorithms would identify that a significant percentage of both companies’ critical components shared the same origin point (Philips’ New Mexico plant).

3. This common dependency would be flagged as a high-risk “strand” connecting both supply chains.

4. When early indicators appeared (such as minor shipment delays or quality variances from the Philips plant), the system would immediately alert both companies to the potential systemic risk.

5. Both Nokia and Ericsson could have initiated contingency planning weeks before the fire occurred, based on these early warning signals.

In this scenario, Ericsson would have had the same early warning advantage that Nokia created through their proactive supply chain management practices, potentially changing the entire competitive landscape of the mobile phone industry.

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