SUMMARY
Oracle Fusion: Why It Was Created, Why It Struggled
The Genesis (2004-2005): Oracle acquired PeopleSoft for $10.3B (2004) and Siebel for $5.85B (2005)—hostile takeovers that left them with four incompatible enterprise application lines (E-Business Suite, PeopleSoft, JD Edwards, Siebel). Project Fusion was announced as the solution: a unified, SOA-based platform that would merge the best of all four into a next-generation suite.
The Problem:
- Took 6 years to reach general availability (2005→2011)
- Key executive John Wookey (head of Fusion strategy) departed in 2007, raising concerns about viability
- Built on the flawed premise that architectural consolidation = customer adoption
- Even today, research shows 75% implementation failure rates for Oracle Fusion Cloud ERP
- The 2007-2008 Procurement Insights posts documented the architectural limitations before most analysts caught on
SAP Safe Passage: Why It Was Created, Why It Collapsed
The Genesis (2005): SAP launched Safe Passage immediately after Oracle’s PeopleSoft acquisition—a program to capture the 2,000+ joint SAP/PeopleSoft customers who were suddenly nervous about Oracle’s plans. SAP acquired TomorrowNow, a third-party support provider, to offer cut-rate maintenance for PeopleSoft/JDE customers as a bridge to SAP migration.
The Collapse:
- 2007: Oracle sued SAP, alleging TomorrowNow illegally downloaded thousands of Oracle software files and support materials
- 2008: SAP shut down TomorrowNow
- 2010: Jury awarded Oracle $1.3 billion (the largest copyright verdict in history at the time)
- 2014: Final settlement: $357 million + $120 million in legal fees
- Safe Passage was effectively abandoned; SAP pivoted to S/4HANA
The Pattern: Both programs were acquisition-driven, technology-first strategies that assumed vendor scale could solve adoption problems. Neither addressed organizational readiness.
Hansen Models: Why They Endured
While Oracle and SAP were betting billions on platform consolidation, Hansen’s SR&ED-funded work (1998) was proving a different thesis: readiness precedes technology.
- 1998-2005: DND deployment achieved 97.3% delivery accuracy—not by buying a better platform, but by designing for agent-based coordination
- 2007-2008: Procurement Insights archive documented why Fusion and Safe Passage would struggle before they did
- 2025: The Stanford/Harvard paper validates the same architecture Hansen operationalized 27 years earlier
The graph tells the story: vendor strategies spike and crash; readiness-first methodology compounds.
-30-
Procurement Insights
Two Billion-Dollar Strategies Failed. One Didn’t. Here’s Why.
Posted on December 24, 2025
0
SUMMARY
Oracle Fusion: Why It Was Created, Why It Struggled
The Genesis (2004-2005): Oracle acquired PeopleSoft for $10.3B (2004) and Siebel for $5.85B (2005)—hostile takeovers that left them with four incompatible enterprise application lines (E-Business Suite, PeopleSoft, JD Edwards, Siebel). Project Fusion was announced as the solution: a unified, SOA-based platform that would merge the best of all four into a next-generation suite.
The Problem:
SAP Safe Passage: Why It Was Created, Why It Collapsed
The Genesis (2005): SAP launched Safe Passage immediately after Oracle’s PeopleSoft acquisition—a program to capture the 2,000+ joint SAP/PeopleSoft customers who were suddenly nervous about Oracle’s plans. SAP acquired TomorrowNow, a third-party support provider, to offer cut-rate maintenance for PeopleSoft/JDE customers as a bridge to SAP migration.
The Collapse:
The Pattern: Both programs were acquisition-driven, technology-first strategies that assumed vendor scale could solve adoption problems. Neither addressed organizational readiness.
Hansen Models: Why They Endured
While Oracle and SAP were betting billions on platform consolidation, Hansen’s SR&ED-funded work (1998) was proving a different thesis: readiness precedes technology.
The graph tells the story: vendor strategies spike and crash; readiness-first methodology compounds.
-30-
Share this:
Related