Over the past several weeks, I’ve seen and read a series of posts about CIO surveys, CPO conferences, and the growing emphasis on AI strategy, orchestration, and operating models.
Those conversations reminded me of one of the foundational principles behind the Toyota Production System: Genchi Genbutsu (現地現物) — often translated as “go and see for yourself.”
It wasn’t simply a management philosophy. It was a discipline.
The assumption was straightforward: decisions should be grounded in the reality of how work actually happens, not in reports, organizational charts, or assumptions formed several layers above the work itself.
That principle feels especially relevant today.
Many organizations still make technology decisions from the top of the organization and then expect the people closest to the work to execute them successfully. The CIO approves the architecture. The executive team approves the investment. Procurement and operational teams inherit the responsibility for making it work.
Twenty-eight years ago, the Department of National Defence project taught me the same lesson from a different direction. The performance problem wasn’t solved by replacing technology or redesigning the organization. It was solved by first understanding what was actually happening inside the work.
The same realization appeared again in 2007 when Virginia’s eProcurement initiative became the basis for the Yes Virginia! There is More to e-Procurement Than Software series. What stood out wasn’t the software selection. It was that the people expected to execute the new environment were deeply involved in defining how the organization actually operated before technology was introduced.
Looking back, that wasn’t accidental.
Today, many ProcureTech and AI initiatives still begin with executive selection followed by frontline execution. The people who must ultimately live inside the new operating model frequently have the least influence over defining it.
That isn’t a criticism of executive leadership. Strategic investment decisions belong there.
But it does expose an important gap.
In many organizations, even “go and see” tours show leaders the organization as it’s supposed to operate, not necessarily how it actually operates under real-world conditions.
Genchi Genbutsu reminds us to observe reality directly.
Over nearly three decades of work, I found there was another question that had to come first:
Does our declared model of how this organization works actually match the operating reality?
Observation alone doesn’t reveal hidden incentives.
It doesn’t expose shadow processes.
It doesn’t explain why timing, workarounds, or seemingly unrelated interactions produce outcomes that nobody predicted.
Those patterns only emerge when the operating reality itself becomes the object of inquiry.
That is ultimately why the Hansen Models evolved into Phase 0™.
Not to replace SCOR.
Not to replace Theory of Constraints.
Not to replace Lean, Six Sigma, or relational operating models.
And certainly not to replace Genchi Genbutsu.
Instead, they begin with a different question:
Before we optimize the system…are we certain we’ve correctly modeled the one we’re standing in?
Perhaps that is the next evolution of “go and see.”
Go.
See.
Then validate what you think you saw before you optimize it.
-30-
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Recent CIO Surveys and CPO Conferences Made Me Think of Genchi Genbutsu (現地現物): Here’s Why.
Posted on July 28, 2026
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Over the past several weeks, I’ve seen and read a series of posts about CIO surveys, CPO conferences, and the growing emphasis on AI strategy, orchestration, and operating models.
Those conversations reminded me of one of the foundational principles behind the Toyota Production System: Genchi Genbutsu (現地現物) — often translated as “go and see for yourself.”
It wasn’t simply a management philosophy. It was a discipline.
The assumption was straightforward: decisions should be grounded in the reality of how work actually happens, not in reports, organizational charts, or assumptions formed several layers above the work itself.
That principle feels especially relevant today.
Many organizations still make technology decisions from the top of the organization and then expect the people closest to the work to execute them successfully. The CIO approves the architecture. The executive team approves the investment. Procurement and operational teams inherit the responsibility for making it work.
Twenty-eight years ago, the Department of National Defence project taught me the same lesson from a different direction. The performance problem wasn’t solved by replacing technology or redesigning the organization. It was solved by first understanding what was actually happening inside the work.
The same realization appeared again in 2007 when Virginia’s eProcurement initiative became the basis for the Yes Virginia! There is More to e-Procurement Than Software series. What stood out wasn’t the software selection. It was that the people expected to execute the new environment were deeply involved in defining how the organization actually operated before technology was introduced.
Looking back, that wasn’t accidental.
Today, many ProcureTech and AI initiatives still begin with executive selection followed by frontline execution. The people who must ultimately live inside the new operating model frequently have the least influence over defining it.
That isn’t a criticism of executive leadership. Strategic investment decisions belong there.
But it does expose an important gap.
In many organizations, even “go and see” tours show leaders the organization as it’s supposed to operate, not necessarily how it actually operates under real-world conditions.
Genchi Genbutsu reminds us to observe reality directly.
Over nearly three decades of work, I found there was another question that had to come first:
Does our declared model of how this organization works actually match the operating reality?
Observation alone doesn’t reveal hidden incentives.
It doesn’t expose shadow processes.
It doesn’t explain why timing, workarounds, or seemingly unrelated interactions produce outcomes that nobody predicted.
Those patterns only emerge when the operating reality itself becomes the object of inquiry.
That is ultimately why the Hansen Models evolved into Phase 0™.
Not to replace SCOR.
Not to replace Theory of Constraints.
Not to replace Lean, Six Sigma, or relational operating models.
And certainly not to replace Genchi Genbutsu.
Instead, they begin with a different question:
Before we optimize the system…are we certain we’ve correctly modeled the one we’re standing in?
Perhaps that is the next evolution of “go and see.”
Go.
See.
Then validate what you think you saw before you optimize it.
-30-
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